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The (Ancient Greek) Subject Supposed to Believe 
Esther Eidinow, University of Bristol 
 
Abstract: This article discusses the challenges facing scholars exploring the nature of 
belief in ancient Greek religion. While recent scholarship has raised questions about 
individual religious activities, and work on ritual, the body, and the senses has 
broadened our methodological palette, the nature and dynamics of generally held 
“low intensity” beliefs still tend to be described simply as “unquestioned” or 
“embedded” in society. But examining scholarship on divine personifications 
suggests that ancient beliefs were — and our perceptions of them are — more 
complex. This article first explores the example of Tyche (“Chance”), in order to 
highlight some of the problems that surround the use of the term “belief.” It then turns 
to the theories of “ideology” of Slavoj Žižek and Robert Pfaller and argues that these 
can offer provocative insights into the nature and dynamics of ritual and belief in 
ancient Greek culture. 
 
1 Introduction: Tyche — Concept or Goddess? 
We are in ancient Athens, settling into our seats in the Theater of Dionysos, looking 
forward to the latest clever new play by Menander. Aspis (The Shield) promises the 
usual sparkling mix of comedy, coincidence, and sharp characterization — and the 
first scene does not disappoint. We meet Daos, slave to the mercenary soldier 
Kleostratos, grief-stricken at the apparent loss of his master in battle, and Smikrines, 
Kleostratos’ acquisitive uncle, positively drooling at the thought of all the booty that 
Kleostratos managed to collect before he died. When they leave the stage, a woman 
takes their place: it is time for the prologue. Step-by-step, she relates what will 
happen, introducing us to the characters, their flaws and virtues; revealing the 
discoveries they will make; disclosing their punishments and rewards. Her remarkably 
detailed knowledge of events to come makes it clear that she is a goddess, but which 
one? It is only when she comes to the end of her speech that she finally lets us know: 
“I’ve still to tell you who I am, the steward and judge controlling all this. Tyche.” 
(Aspis, ll. 147–148, adapted from Arnott 1979). We are face to face with the goddess 
of chance: Lady Luck herself. 
 Aspis was probably written in the last quarter of the fourth century BCE, 
although the exact date is unknown. Tyche’s appearance in the play suggests that this 
goddess was already well known, and certainly she is the dominant divinity of new 
comedy: a fragment of Menander calls her the only divinity (Men. fr. 681 K-A; on 
Tyche/tyche in new comedy, see Vogt-Spira 1992). But both literary references and 
material evidence indicate that she was regarded as a goddess within and outside 
Athens before this time (see Hamdorf 1964 s.v. “Tyche”; Matheson 1994b: 18–22). In 
the centuries to come, her cult burgeoned, and she received an extensive, organized 
cult that spread across the Mediterranean, with numerous cities setting up a statue of 
Tyche in a prominent position and imprinting her image on the local currency (Dohrn 
1960: 26–28; Broucke 1994: 40). Her popularity also seems to have extended beyond 
this civic level: evidence suggests that individuals wore her image on jewelry and 
collected figurines made in her shape (see Stansbury-O’Donnell 1994: 54, fig. 31, 115, 
nos. 46 and 47). The image of Tyche was everywhere, revealing the extent of her 
influence across the Mediterranean — and something, I think, of the development of a 
shared understanding of, and approach to, the uncertain future, albeit through a range 
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of cultural models (see Eidinow 2011).  
 In the face of such ancient popularity, our modern attitude to Tyche is 
complex and ambivalent. To modern minds, the deification of abstract concepts 
remains a fascinating puzzle. Intrigued by their apparent parallel existence as both 
abstract concepts and divinities, scholars have been reluctant to credit these entities 
with real religious significance, even when there is evidence for widespread cult. 
Tyche may be seen as “die Signatur des beginnenden Hellenismus” (Nilsson 1967: 
301), but what kind of signature remains unclear: should her burgeoning deification 
be understood to mark the contemptible disintegration of traditional religion, or to 
indicate laudable progress towards a more modern rationality? The tendency has been 
to describe her/it as an expression of a sense of vulnerability among the populations 
that worshipped her (see below, “Tyche as a Problem of Belief”). Although no doubt 
this may have been a part of what Tyche represented, as a summary of her cultural 
role, it seems very limited. It suggests that as scholars we view her in terms of an 
absence (of cultural confidence or tradition) rather than as a (divine) presence; we 
doubt that her worshippers saw her as an authentic goddess. There is room for such 
doubt, of course, when we turn to ancient texts. For example, the word would not 
have been capitalized in those sources, making it more difficult for us to understand 
whether or not it indicated a god, a personified force, or simply an abstract concept 
(Eidinow 2011).1 But, as I argue below, there are also indications that the questions 
arise not from our ancient evidence so much as from our own attitudes to and 
understandings of what factors should be seen to be present in that evidence, in order 
for us to accept the idea of belief in an ancient divinity. 
 The difficulties that arise when we investigate the phenomenon of Tyche draw 
into useful relief some of the questions we face more generally when we investigate 
ancient attitudes and attachments to the supernatural (I use this term to indicate my 
intention to include not only those practices traditionally described as “religious” but 
also those designated as “magical”) and the difficulties of considering the mental 
processes of our historical subjects. Henk Versnel has provided a persuasive argument 
for the use of the term “belief” by modern scholars to describe such phenomena in the 
ancient world. Stating that “the pantheon of the polis was as self-evident and 
unquestioned as the polis and her socio-cultural codes” (2011: 292), he proposes that 
modern scholars accept the undeniable pervasive presence of low-intensity beliefs in 
ancient society.2  
 But there are difficulties with this on two related fronts: first, that it did not 
work so completely as Versnel suggests has been argued by, for example, recent work 
on atheism in the ancient world (Whitmarsh 2016). Second, modern scholars remain 
uncertain about the nature and operations of such widespread belief anyway. As this 
article argues, analysis of studies of Tyche indicate that not only are scholars 
uncertain about the utility of the idea of belief, per se, but there are also differences in 
scholars’ perceptions of the quality or authenticity of “belief,” according to the nature, 
context, and target of a religious practice.While Versnel lucidly shows how literary 
evidence demonstrates the role of divinity in providing multiple (and often mutually 
contradictory) explanations of events, his discussion does not probe how, beyond this 
intellectual attachment, such an apparent low-intensity belief in a divinity may have 
                                                
1 In this article, where Tyche is intended to be understood as personified and deified, she will 
appear with a capital letter. 
2 Van Baal 1976 for the original formulation of “high-” and “low-” intensity rites; see Ekroth 2002 
and 2008. The phrase is adopted by Versnel to describe belief (2011: 548, 558). 
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worked — at either the individual or the broader social and cultural levels. 
 Thus, this article suggests that alongside investigations of the presence, or not, 
of individual “belief” (or atheism), it may be helpful to those endeavors to address the 
question of belief from another direction, that is, by exploring the processes 
(conceptual and embodied) that may have comprised low-intensity rituals and 
associated beliefs, the underpinnings of the relationships of ancient Greek men and 
women with supernatural entities, within their social groupings and wider culture. To 
do this, I turn to the concept of “ideology” and draw on some of the insights to which 
this then leads, in particular in the writings of Slavoj Žižek and Robert Pfaller, 
building on Jacques Lacan’s work and that of Louis Althusser. Their ideas, although 
relating to another time and place in their formulation, may yet provide historians of 
ancient (Greek) religion with a provocative model for comprehending how sets of 
ideas, emerging from social and political structures, could interrelate to create, as it 
were, maps of meaning, in which individuals became enmeshed or embedded — and, 
thus, how such a figure as Tyche could become the recipient of religious “belief”. 
 
2 Tyche as a Problem of Belief 
In contrast to ancient attitudes, much modern scholarship on divine personifications 
focuses on explaining their origins (cf. Borg 2005, esp. 201; but see also Stafford 
2001: 19–23 on some discussions of this question by Roman writers). Some scholars 
seek general trends: for example, they argue that recognition of personifications as 
divinities is symptomatic of larger historical changes,with personifications appearing 
in clusters at particular times.3 3These explanations range from the establishment of 
the characters of the Olympians to a process of general cultural rationalization, in 
which these entities bridged the gap between traditional religious cult and developing 
secularization. Some suggest the development of more personalized and popular gods 
(e.g., Sobel 1990: 10) and increasing (divine) specialization, found also in secular 
contexts (e.g., Stafford 2001: 231); some explore how a cult and its culture have 
interacted, perhaps during a period of change — either consolidation (Richer 2005: 
121) or crisis (Stafford 2001: 229). Alan Shapiro (1993: 269) suggests that the 
representation, in vase painting of the late fifth century, of personifications associated 
with local cults may indicate “a distinct strain of Athenian patriotism;” and an 
argument for the political aspect of Athenian representations of personification is 
made by Amy Smith (2011). Acknowledgement and exploration of such specific 
dimensions of religious activity can only enhance our understanding of ancient daily 
life (see Thériault 1996: 187). The argument that there may have been a variety of 
ways in which such entities developed and were expressed (for example, that mythic 
status may not reflect cult status, and vice versa) has brought with it a growing 
acceptance of the perceived divinity of personifications. But while the tenet that a 
divine personification was no more than a symbol (Nilsson 1952: 38 and Burkert 
1985: 38, but cf. Burkert 2006: 14, 18–20) has largely been left behind (e.g., Thériault 
1996: 184–188; Stafford 2001: 228) some significant hesitations seem to remain 
concerning what this means for the idea of belief in these entities. For example, 
Stafford draws a qualified parallel with myth: 
Veyne’s question, “Did the Greeks believe in their myths?” has basically to 
be answered “Yes,” with due allowance for different modes of belief, and 
I would argue that personifications were “believed in” in just the same 
                                                
3 On Homeric examples, see Burkert 1985: 184–187; on the mid-sixth century, Humphreys 
1986: 92–110; on the mid-fifth century, Nilsson 1952: 31–40 and 1967[1950]: 812; and on the 
fourth century, Parker 1996: 235–236 
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way as the rest of the Greek pantheon — rationally by the analytically 
inclined, perhaps, but respected as powerful by the vast majority. (Stafford 
2001: 230) 
Later (232) she raises the possibility that these entities would have “appealed 
particularly to the more intellectually minded.” Indeed, as described below, the sense 
that these personifications indicate a more secular mind-set still lingers, more or less 
explicitly, for many scholars. There seems to be considerable doubt that the nature of 
“belief” in personifications can have been the same as for the traditional gods. 
 In Tyche’s case, theories of origin are related to ontological questions: 
scholarship on Tyche has tended to focus on the question of status, of both the entity 
itself (was Tyche a divinity or just a personified abstract concept — or, perhaps, not 
even that?) and those who worshipped her/it. Thus, as Kenneth Dover succinctly put it, 
“personification of tykhe can be treated more as a grammatical than as a theological 
phenomenon” (1974: 140); while Frank Walbank vividly called her/it an “inchoate 
area of popular thought” (2007: 354). An older stream of scholarship saw Tyche as 
the instigator of cultural deterioration. For example, Buriks described Tyche as a 
“phenomenon of disintegration … a symptom of a diminished energy and unhinged 
morals by the side of a decreasing political power” (1948: 128–129); while Dodds 
described how “the progressive decay of tradition set the religious man free to choose 
his own gods” and compared the cult of Tyche to ruler-cults, which, he observed, 
were “primarily … expressions of helpless dependence” (1951: 242–243). In contrast, 
later scholars have examined Tyche’s appearances in historical and philosophical 
texts as “a topic of intellectual inquiry” (cf. Shipley 2000: 174–175). These 
approaches find in her/its development an indication of the intellectual development 
of personal responsibility and the complex question of free will. For example, Burkert 
(1985: 186) argued that the rise of such personifications filled the vacuum left by the 
growing skepticism about the Homeric gods and were a gift for “the man of 
intelligence” who could not “dispute the importance of the phenomena and situations 
designated by abstract terms.” But across all these interpretations, scholars still tend 
to reject the notion that Tyche was an object of (authentic) religious belief. 
 Instead, scholars offer a variety of explanations of Tyche’s ambiguous status. 
For example, both Jon Mikalson (1983) and Gunther Martin (2009) discuss references 
to fortune dating to the fourth century BCE. Mikalson argues that literary references 
to Tyche were intended primarily to explain episodes of misfortune that could not 
(ideologically) be attributed to the gods; he equates Tyche, in this sense, with a 
daimon (see Mikalson 1983: 19, 50, 59–62). Episodes where Tyche is clearly cast as 
responsible for more complex events or for good fortune do not complicate or nuance 
this analysis: they are explained as “harbingers of the future development and 
importance of a cult of Fortune” (61). And perhaps it is in order to strengthen this 
argument that he tends to describe these statements about Tyche’s activities in the 
passive voice (see esp. 19), noting how responsibility for an event was “diverted” or 
“attributed” to Tyche, a turn of phrase that scarcely communicates the agency 
attributed to Tyche’s active interventions in daily life. As a result, he concludes that in 
ancient Greek society there existed an antithesis between Tyche (here cast as 
“misfortune”) and the gods, which was “simplistic and na.ve, but … clearly 
acceptable at the popular level,” while noting that there is “no indication in our 
sources of any theological or philosophical basis to this antithesis” (60). 
 As well as reducing the complexity of Tyche’s perceived arena of activity, 
Mikalson provides a somewhat limited impression of the richness of ancient attitudes 
to Tyche, by concentrating on only the evidence for civic cult activity. For example, 
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he mentions only briefly the evidence that suggests Tyche (or Agathe Tyche) may 
have received worship from individuals as early as the first half of the fourth century, 
and only as a sign of the development of later cult (60).4 He denies that the ancient 
audience of Demosthenes’ On the Crown would have heard mention of the city’s 
Tyche as references to a supernatural power, on the grounds that they were not overtly 
concerned with the cult of Agathe Tyche. Other scholars have interpreted this material 
very differently; for example, Giannopoulou notes how the evidence for the goddess 
on a private monument in the first half of the fourth century (IG II2 4564 and LIMC 
s.v. Tyche 2) is an example of how “state cults lag behind individual and popular 
beliefs” (2001: 2). Overall, Mikalson’s approach can be summed up by the entry in 
his index (169), “Fortune, as quasi-religious figure,” a sub-category that is not 
explained in terms of its implications for either the status of this entity or the 
contemporary attitudes of the Greeks. 
 Where Mikalson’s argument suggests that the status of, and nature of belief in, 
Tyche was weak and restricted, Gunther Martin’s analysis of the religious discourse 
of fourth-century Athenian orators opts for a more clear-cut division of both aspects. 
In his discussion of Aeschines’ Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes’ answering On 
the Crown, he argues that, whereas Aeschines may refer to a religious sense of Tyche, 
in contrast, Demosthenes uses Tyche with a “non-religious” sense (2009: 97). And yet, 
it seems unlikely that the jurors, having just listened to Aeschines’ speech with its 
emphasis on the religious meaning of Tyche, would not have been looking for more 
of the same, rather than accepting an implicit recasting of the term. As already noted, 
there is some evidence to suggest that the idea of Tyche as a divinity was not alien to 
them, and it seems likely that the discussion of the Tyche of the city may have 
reminded them of Athens’ own cult of Agathe Tyche. Moreover, Demosthenes’ own 
language also challenges Martin’s interpretation: he describes the Tyche of cities and 
individuals in terms that suggest divine involvement, including the idea of allocation 
(§§254–255), and being blessed (eudaimonia and eudaimonizō §§254 and 260; as 
Martin notes, 2009: 110, n. 69). Demosthenes has also made explicit connections 
between how events have turned out and divine involvement, which are scarcely 
trivial parts of his argument, bearing in mind what he is setting out to disprove.5 
 It seems likely that Aeschines is anxious to use Tyche (or whatever other 
evidence he can) in a particular sense to bolster his argument that Demosthenes 
betrayed Athens. Similarly, Demosthenes is anxious to refute Aeschines’ accusations 
that his own personal Tyche can be blamed for Athens’ suffering. But to do this it 
would surely be important that he not deny its religious aspects, that he stay within 
the idiom that Aeschines had chosen (which was widely understood), in order to 
prove him wrong. In this way he would (and I believe does) demonstrate how 
Aeschines (already established as having a religiously dubious religious background) 
has misunderstood and misinterpreted the role of Tyche. Rather than denying Tyche a 
religious role, Demosthenes sets out to explain the limits of the influence that an 
individual person can exercise: this is neither a new religious topic nor one that is 
limited, in the divine sphere, to Tyche. 
 It could be argued that the evidence here depends, at least in part, on 
interpretation of literary passages, but looking to scholarship on slightly later periods, 
                                                
4 He cites evidence for “fortune in New Comedy” (130, n. 22). For epigraphic evidence, cf. 
Hamdorf 1964: 97–100; Tracy 1994: 244; Parker 1996: 231, n. 49. 
5 Martin notes these passages (95 and 100) but regards them as unimportant: the various roles 
of “a god” (theos) §§193, 195, 200; a daimon, §192; associated with Tyche, §194. 
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the problems with allowing the possibility that there was belief in a divine Tyche do 
not end as evidence for cult develops. For example, Graham Shipley, acknowledges 
Tyche’s role in public cult but questions what this means for personal belief in Tyche. 
He states that, on the one hand, “She had an official city cult in many places,” but, on 
the other, “There seems to be little or no evidence for widespread participation in cult 
ritual for the goddess Tyche, as seems to be the case for the new universal goddesses” 
(2000: 174). His explanation for this apparent contradiction lies in the observation 
that “the personified goddess always seems to shade off into the city’s own Tyche or 
good fortune” (174). Implicit in this statement is a division between, on the one hand, 
an official, public cult entity (Tyche as the city’s good fortune) and, on the other, the 
possibility of authentic individual religious feeling. To his credit, Shipley argues 
against the idea that the prominence of Tyche is a sign of “instability and socio-
cultural breakdown” (175), but this appears to be based on the argument that Tyche 
was simply not that important, a conclusion perhaps belied by his own summary of 
her appearance across literary sources and in cult. 
 These modern scholarly approaches to the question of Tyche’s ontology are 
interesting not only because of their insights into this ancient concept — as Kenneth 
Dover observed, how we deliberate on this question of divine status has profound 
implications for our understanding of ancient Greek morality (Dover 1974: 141) — 
but also because of the light they shed, inadvertently, on our own ideas about belief, 
what it is and how it works, both in the ancient world and, perhaps implicitly, in our 
own. They show, for example, particular concern with the perceived status and nature 
of the entity in which “belief” may or may not be invested. We might see this as 
illustrating a problem with an entity that has no mythic content, and which often 
seems to play a particular intellectual role, providing an explanation for events. In 
addition, it also suggests we need to examine our assumptions about the meaning of 
“belief” and the part we expect it to play for our subjects. What is intended by “belief” 
when we try to describe it in terms of public and private or civic and individual? 
Related to this is a question about the kind of evidence that demonstrates belief. 
Both scholars discussed above turn to ritual — apparently seeing it as a corollary of 
belief — but they do so in different ways. Mikalson appears to argue that civic rather 
than individual cult is important, but discounts it as evidence for individual belief; 
Shipley is similarly uncertain about the significance of public cult, seeing individual 
activity as demonstrating meaningful participation. 
 The next sections of the article turn to these questions in reverse order: first, 
the relationship between belief and ritual (3); then, some of the difficulties scholars 
face when using the term “belief” (4). The sections that follow then offer an 
alternative analytical approach to belief, based on a modern formulation of “ideology” 
(5–9); and argue for its relevance to the ancient world and to Tyche in particular (10 
and 11). 
 
3 Belief and Ritual 
The focus by Mikalson and Martin on orthopraxy and the concomitant relative 
unimportance or inaccessibility of “belief” occurs more broadly in scholarship on 
ancient religions.6 This is understandable: when we turn to the ancient world with its 
polytheistic, non-dogmatic religions there are obvious difficulties in locating 
individual statements of belief. This is one of the factors that has led to what Henk 
Versnel has identified as our “modern notion [that] ‘belief ’ did not and could not 
                                                
6 Cf. for example, Rüpke 2016: esp. 3–4, where the concept of “belief” is elided in favor of a discussion of 
individual appropriation, which focuses on “individual, everyday action.” 
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‘exist’ in Greek (or any other traditional non-Christian) religion” (2011: 539). He 
provides a detailed discussion of the recent history of what he sees as “a vexing and 
… sorely misguided recent campaign against the legitimacy of using the terms 
‘belief/believe’ in the study of Greek religion” (App. 4). The response — to focus on 
ritual — receives short shrift: Versnel has argued that “Stating that Greek religion is 
ritualist and at the same time that ‘the Athenians did not believe in their gods’ is 
either nonsense or a kind of sophistry run wild, which should be banished from 
scholarly discourse” (567). But this apparent opposition of ritual and belief may be 
mutually destructive: Humphrey and Laidlaw trace (in their discipline of 
anthropology) the influence of post-Reformation Protestantism and how “the efficacy 
of ritual has been terminally undermined by understanding ritualization as a modality 
for communicating or expressing the religious beliefs and moral ideas of the 
participants” (1994: 8). As they summarize: “so pervasive is this idea that ritual on its 
own, without subjective convictions, comes, for many, to seem mere mumbo-jumbo” 
(8). 
 Perhaps it is in response to such a dynamic that the field of ancient Greek 
religion has burgeoned with studies of ritual. This is a bigger area of study than can be 
summarized here, but a few examples can illustrate the point. In the introduction to a 
collection of papers on ritual, Eftychia Stavrianopoulou emphasizes, very successfully, 
ritual’s performative and communicative modalities, drawing attention to it as a “part 
of public life” (2006: 8). While her introduction does not address the question of the 
subjective convictions of those participating in the ritual (and the term “belief” is not 
listed in the index of the volume, nor investigated in its introduction), nevertheless, it 
still asks the reader to consider the mental activities of the historical subjects. The 
focus is placed on the “communicative tasks” a ritual may fulfill, including “the 
transmission of norms of behavior, the demonstration of intentions, the assignment of 
tasks and roles, the inclusion or exclusion of individuals” (9). A similar approach is 
found in other chapters in the collection. For example, Frederick Naerebout suggests 
that dance relates to belief insofar as dance is “a vehicle, which effectively carries 
whatever meaning it is made to carry in a given context” (2006: 63). Walter Burkert’s 
reflections further reinforce this contrast between mental activity and embodied, 
communicative expression, when he argues that making an “oath and belief in a 
divinity are directly connected” (2006: 24), but then denies the idea that ancient 
rituals surrounding the dead “require a special, personal belief, which is why one 
cannot conclude anything about belief from ritual” (35). Instead, he explains such 
rituals as offering “a tracery, formation, stylization of that which is necessary, in order 
to overcome individual aimlessness and depression” (35). 
 Elsewhere, other scholars also seek generalized causes — emotional or 
intellectual — to help explain common ritual activities. For example, in discussion of 
first offerings, Theodora Jim notes the widespread acceptance of “low intensity 
beliefs” (2014: 59–60; see also, for example, Yunis 1988; King 2003). In order to 
explore these further, she turns her attention specifically to the identification of the 
potential motivations of individual ancient Greek worshippers in performing such cult 
acts.7 This provides a useful insight into the intellectual justification that an ancient 
individual might have made for embarking on a particular ritual of some kind. A 
different kind of insight is provided by the recent burgeoning interest in the senses 
(Betts 2017).8 The employment of such heuristic tools to explore ancient ritual (see, 
                                                
7 Cf. Robert Parker who states that the Greeks worshipped the gods because “experience shows, benefit derives 
from doing so” (2011: 32). 
8 See also the volumes in the series The Senses in Antiquity, published by Routledge. 
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for example, Weddell 2017) offer great potential for comprehending more fully the 
experience of an individual engaged in the process of a (commonplace) ritual. Indeed 
these studies of ancient rituals, while, in general, not delving into the problem of 
subjective convictions, do offer a variety of rich and rewarding techniques for 
interrogating the inner experiences of individuals. What may seem like an omission or 
elision of “belief” may simply be the result of implicit acknowledgement of the idea 
that (as studies from anthropology and the field of the study of religions demonstrate) 
we can no longer assume that a ritual act is directly connected to belief in a divinity. 
As, for example, Humphrey and Laidlaw (1994) have shown in the context of the Jain 
puja ritual, for those enacting ritual activities, such a connection may be far from 
direct, if, indeed, it exists at all.9 
 
4 The Meanings of Belief 
In making such an analysis, we must recognize that part of the problem lies with the 
difficulties of using the term “belief.” This is not the place for a history of the term, 
but suffice it to say that both diachronic and synchronic studies of the idea of “belief” 
and the process of “believing” have suggested that the central role that we perceive 
these to play in religion, in particular with regard to the individual, may be a modern, 
Western creation. This has been posited by the anthropologist Rodney Needham, who 
famously argued that in many other cultures mortal relationships with metaphysical 
powers do not seem to involve “believing” as we describe it (Needham 1972: esp. 32–
39). He went on to suggest that in fact it is impossible even in our own culture to 
define “belief” — and this is because “the phenomenon of belief consists in no more 
than the custom of making statements about belief” (131). In order to demonstrate 
why this is, Needham distinguishes between the lexical and ideational histories of the 
word (41) and traces both, demonstrating how and why “belief” and “believing” 
possess myriad senses — a result of their long development and “continual 
elaboration” across time and cultures. In particular, he highlights the ways in which 
the idea of belief was formed in and between Jewish and Christian religious discourse 
(50); and he notes how it moved from a meaning of “loyalty,” emphasized in the 
Hebrew of the Old Testament (48), to individual “acceptance of the message of Christ” 
— a meaning that was “only perpetuated and multiplied through centuries of 
dogmatic strife, theological explication, and the arduous ingenuities of translators” 
(59). 
 That the idea of “belief” originally indicated “loyalty” is also part of the 
argument of Wilfred Cantwell Smith, who explores how, in pre-Enlightenment 
literature the verb “believing” meant “to hold dear” or “to prize” and was used 
primarily in personal or second-person statements of other people, to mark a personal 
pledge, a deliberate act, of allegiance and commitment (1998 esp. 41–44). He states 
that “Belief in the modern meaning of the word has had no place in the history of 
Christian thought” (78). It is perhaps, as modern translations of the Bible suggest, 
closer in meaning to our modern concept “faith,” and supporting this he notes how 
belief is to hold an opinion “whether it be right or wrong,” whereas faith is “the 
capacity to see” the presence of the divine (79). Moreover, well into the 
Enlightenment, the meaning of belief was closely related to the idea of truth: indeed, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
9 Indeed, a similar bias away from the “study of belief as a religious experience” has been noted 
in the discipline of anthropology, despite “interesting analyses of ritual symbolism and of its 
various ways of generating meaning and effectiveness” (Severi 2007: 22). 
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it was a step beyond knowledge, such that Francis Bacon could describe it as “the 
enjoyment of truth” following two previous stages of “wooing of truth” and “the 
presence of it” (1853[1625]: 11) — not the same, as Smith (1998: 61) observes, as 
opining that “God is”. Since then, as Smith shows (1977: 47–48), it is possible to 
chart the gradual move of this term toward a meaning of propositional belief. It has 
undergone a gradual severing of its original link with the truth, become increasingly 
abstract and impersonal, and is used now to describe “the mental state of having some 
attitude, stance, take, or opinion about a proposition or about the potential state of 
affairs in which that proposition is true” (Schwitzgebel 2008).  
 Indeed, this term, and the mental state it describes, as Michel de Certeau 
(1985b: esp. 153) has suggested, may now also be used to denote doubt. He 
emphasizes the way in which the meaning of this term interacts with other material 
developments: whereas we were once obliged to believe what we could not see, 
nowadays, surrounded by information, we expect to know because we see instantly — 
you have to see it to believe it. Belief is not just a finite, transferable quantity that can 
be redirected; now it is being exhausted, “an object captured and dealt with by 
advertising, business and fashion” (148), desperately recreated through “simulacra of 
credibility” (154), such as corporate mission statements and marketing blurbs, and 
disturbingly selfreferential, as opinion polls reveal to us what it is we all believe. 
Belief is becoming increasingly individualized — and increasingly fragmented, a 
“multiplication of convictions” (151) replacing traditional faith. In our complex 
society, belief and practice can combine in many different ways — and even not 
combine at all. Believing is now an intellectual exercise, and “practice no longer the 
transparent objectivity of a belief” (196–197). In this modern world, superstitions 
survive as traces of notions that have somehow (shamefully?) escaped modern 
methods of investigation (de Certeau 1985a: 197). Thus, the idea of belief still, 
importantly, maintains a sense of non-propositional truth, a sense of conviction, while 
at the same time it indicates doubt, a set of “representations” to which we no longer 
feel allegiance (196). It is “the object of wordplay, an equivocal site” (197) — and 
this is the paradoxical term that acts as the lens of our inquiry into humankind’s 
relationship with the supernatural. 
 
5 From “Belief” to “Ideology” 
Even if we do not subscribe to the arguments of Needham, Smith, and de Certeau, this 
brief overview of the difficulties associated with establishing the meaning of “belief” 
and “believing” suggests that some of the challenges that historians of ancient religion 
confront, as they try to use the language of belief, may lie in the terminology itself, 
and the implicit as well as explicit meanings that it evokes. It is unsurprising that, as 
we have seen above, scholars are trying to find other avenues to describe or explore 
an individual, group, or society’s attachment to the divine. And, in the attempt to 
understand the nature of the inner mental world of our historical subjects and their 
underlying attitudes to/relationships with (a particular) divinity, these explorations are 
extremely fruitful: they highlight the crucial importance of encompassing not only the 
minds of our subjects, but also their bodies, their senses, and the materiality of their 
worlds.10 They may illuminate the more remarkable instances of individual 
interactions with the gods, but they also add some further dimensions to our analysis 
of everyday, low-intensity ritual activities and associated beliefs. By this, I am 
referring to the kind of total social reality of Greek religion that scholars have tried to 
                                                
10 Cf. also, focusing on much later, or modern, examples: Meyer 2009; Morgan 2010: 1; Vésquez 2011; Promey 
2014. 
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invoke in descriptions of it as a phenomenon that “penetrated and was penetrated by 
almost every aspect of Greek life” (Parker 1995: 134). Nevertheless, while the 
involvement of the body, senses, and materiality are all crucial aspects of such 
analyses, the accompanying mental activity, the ways in which individual and wider 
culture interacted at this level, remains opaque. 
 In order to explore this aspect further, rather than trying to wring some further 
meaning from the term “belief,” I turn instead to a different etic concept: ideology. 
This may seem an odd suggestion, especially in light of the common understanding 
that an “ideology” is often related to a political or economic setting.11 To clarify (or 
perhaps complicate) that impression, I draw on the work of Slavoj Žižek, which 
provides a very broad, indeed critical, definition of the term: 
“Ideology” can designate anything from a contemplative attitude that 
misrecognises its dependence on social reality to an action-orientated set of 
beliefs, from the indispensable medium through which individuals live out their 
relations to a social structure to false ideas which legitimate a dominant political 
power. 
Žižek 1994: 3–4 
As he indicates, one common approach to ideology is to regard it as a set of 
understandings and attitudes imposed by one group upon another for a specific 
reason: “Ideology is a systematically distorted communication: a text in which, under 
the influence of unavowed social interests (of domination, etc.), a gap separates its 
‘official’, public meaning from its actual intention” (1994: 10). He describes this 
phenomenon of ideology in psychoanalytical terms as the “big Other” — a shared 
illusion that comprises a symbolic order.12 This can be reified or personified, as he 
observes, in a single agent or concept (such as God or Nation): its “complex network 
of rules and other kinds of presuppositions” structure our subjectivization and dictate 
all aspects of our lives (Žižek 2006:9).13 
 However, Žižek’s critique of ideology consists not only in explaining how 
what seems to be the result of an external necessity is in fact a discursive construction, 
but also how and why that construction becomes so persuasive and pervasive. This 
article suggests that this analysis is helpful for exploring the embodied, pervasive 
nature of low-intensity ritual activities and associated beliefs — the everyday ancient 
experience of attachment to the divine — in ancient Greek culture. In what follows, I 
will lay out, as I understand them, some of the social and psychological processes by 
which, according to Žižek, an ideology takes hold, drawing attention to the ways in 
which they may provide insight into the nature of ancient Greek religious structures, 
practices — and beliefs.  
 I make this suggestion aware of the difficulties that scholars have expressed 
concerning the application of theories relating to the modern mind to historical 
                                                
11 The two concepts are commonly opposed in analyses of either “temporal” ideologies or “spiritual” religious 
beliefs; see for this distinction, Aaron 2008: 73; Froese and Bader 2008; Gries, Su, and Schak 2012. In his 
discussion of ideology, Terry Eagleton notes that “ideology” can mean a set of beliefs about something (so a 
religious ideology concerns a set of religious beliefs); and/or an ideology can significantly influence a set of 
beliefs and attitudes (Eagleton 1999: 263–264). Both these meanings are found in sociological analyses of 
modern religious practice (e.g., Richards 1991). This article does not set out to analyze this linguistic relationship, 
but to bring to bear a specific analysis of how ideology functions on the evidence for ancient Greek religion, in 
order to suggest a new approach to the current examination of low-intensity ritual activities and associated beliefs. 
12 On the difference between the “Other” and the “big Other,” see Zeiher 2014. 
13 While Žižek has also written On Belief (2001), I am not concerned with his arguments there. In that book he 
also establishes the existence of an all-encompassing symbolic order. In it he argues that “belief” provides an 
intervention in the symbolic order such that it allows an individual to contemplate acts of intervention in the public 
sphere. However, in the end, the argument is unsatisfying; see Tell 2004 
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subjects. Briefly I note that while it is not possible to enter the minds of others,14 
nevertheless, in the field of ancient history, investigations regularly attribute mental 
processes to individuals and groups in order to explain, or in the course of describing, 
historical events. Such incidental explanations appear to be grounded in an implicit 
set of assumptions about the nature of human knowledge, behavior, and reality — and 
seldom include information about the basis for these unvoiced presuppositions. More 
recently, detailed scholarly work on the emotions and research that draws on a variety 
of cognitive approaches suggest that the internal mental worlds of our historical 
subjects need not be assumed to be impenetrable.15 In terms of applying the theories 
from Žižek’s work, his examples range across histories and cultures, and I take this as 
an indication that he sees utility in diachronic and historical reflections on his 
theories.16 More specifically, in a critique of cultural studies, he contrasts historicicm 
and historicity, noting how adherence to the former leads only to an “endless play of 
substitutions … within the same fundamental mental field,” and “the abandonment of 
the very question of the inherent ‘truth-value’ of a theory under consideration” (Žižek 
2000a: 112); while the latter allows the exploration of “the dialectical tension between 
the domain of historical changes itself and its traumatic ‘ahistorical’ kernel qua its 
condition of (im)possibility” (111–112). Elsewhere, in a discussion of the analysis of 
film, he suggests instead an interpretative approach by which “a set of traces without 
meaning” becomes “open to later reappropriations” (2000b: 246). To this end, the 
arguments below are intended to suggest possibilities, not by ignoring historical 
context and details, but specifically by observing how these may be viewed under a 
different interpretative lens. In this sense, this approach is intended not to be limited 
only to ancient Greek culture. It may be, indeed it is to be hoped, that scholars of 
ritual activities in other historical cultures will find aspects that are relevant and useful 
to their investigations. 
 Thus, in this article, I start with an overview of the individual psychological 
drive (the desire of the Other) that forms the basis for Žižek’s approach to ideology; 
this is not in order to argue that ancient Greek men or women experienced this sense 
of self but to provide a complete interpretative lens through which to view the 
evidence for ancient Greek ritual and belief and attachments to the divine. However, I 
will observe the ways in which evidence for culturally specific emotional responses to 
the demands of the divine can be argued to align with these insights. Then I turn to 
the idea of interpellation, including Žižek’s criticism of it, and the way he embraces 
these questions in order to further his argument. This will introduce the idea of 
objective belief, which will be further explored through discussion of the processes of 
interactivity and interpassivity and their implications for ancient Greek ritual practice. 
                                                
14 The problem is not simply historical, but also recognized in, for example, anthropology: a good overview of this 
aspect is found in Robbins and Rumsey 2008, and the associated papers in the “Social Thought and Commentary” 
that this introduces. 
15 Recent examples of emotional studies include Cairns and Nelis 2017; Eidinow 2016; 




16 I also note the debate that surrounds the historicity of Lacanian theories, including Lacan’s own rejection of the 
idea that that his theories were “ahistorical;” along with commentators who have located particular historical 
frameworks within his writing (e.g., Brennan 1993). It is not possible to resolve this debate here, but I take some 
comfort in applying his theories (via Žižek) from Lacan’s own acknowledgment that while psychoanalysis could 
not claim to provide “the entirety of causes currently operating in our society. Even so, in its treatment of the 
individual psychoanalysis has discovered relational tensions that appear to play a fundamental role in all societies, 
as if the discontent in civilisation went so far as to reveal the very joint of nature to culture” (Lacan 1996 [1966]: 
14). 
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In conclusion, returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this article, I will 
summarize this analysis with a final reflection on how these ideas from Žižek’s 
analysis of ideology can inform our analysis of “belief” in the context of the cult of 
Tyche and more broadly in the field of ancient Greek religion. 
 
6 Desire of the Other: the Possibility of Enculturation 
Drawing on the psychoanalytical theories of Jacques Lacan, and specifically the 
notion of objet petit a, Žižek argues that ideologies provide or comprise fantasies that 
fulfill our most human desire for desire of the Other. Importantly, this formulation can 
be understood at three levels that describe our individual psychological interactions 
with an ideology and which I briefly summarize here (Žižek 1996: 167–168, 
reflecting Lacan’s framework). At the “imaginary” level, this desire of the Other 
manifests most simply as the desire for what another man has, the “day-to-day rivalry 
between me and my double-competitor” (Žižek 1996: 167). This, in turn, is connected 
to the next level, the “symbolic,” where “desire of the Other” has two different, 
interrelated meanings. First, the desire of the Other indicates the subject’s desire 
always to be desired/ recognized by the Other. But this leads to the second meaning: 
in order to be recognized — to gain the desire of the Other — the subject will desire 
what the Other seems to desire. This is, itself, desire of the Other, because the “big 
Other” (the symbolic order) “prescribes to the subject the matrix of his or her desiring” 
(167). The things we desire — from the latest technical gadget to the living of a 
righteous life — are “predetermined and decided … by the symbolic network of the 
cultural tradition to which I belong” (167). However, this is not to say that the subject 
is merely filling in a preordained position; rather, it is her act of subjectivity that itself 
establishes the big Other (136). The process of that subjectivization is discussed in the 
next section of this article, but here I want to emphasize the way in which the 
symbolic order remains a fiction, a “presupposition by each of the individuals, of the 
already-existing co-ordination of all other individuals” (140). While a Master-
Signifier (such as “Nation” or “Democracy”) becomes the “something” with which 
we identify and around which we rally, the true meaning of this Master-Signifier 
remains open or empty (142). 
 And this perhaps helps to clarify the reading of desire of the Other at the third 
and final level, the Real. This concerns what “resists symbolization,” that is, “the 
enigma of the Other’s desire” (168). Because the big Other is incomplete, because it 
is up to the subject to create the big Other, this means that the subject is never certain 
what the Other wants from her — and because the “desire of the subject is the desire 
of the other … I, the subject, never know what I really want, since the Other’s desire 
remains forever an enigma to me” (164). This uncertainty has further implications: 
first, it means that desire of the Other can never actually be satisfied; second, and 
importantly, it generates the subject’s desire always to try to “ascertain her status as 
object of the Other’s desire” (164). Thus, we can see how these different readings of 
the “desire of the other” convey the mental processes (conscious and unconscious) of 
the subject of ideology. These structures of desire (the conscious desire for those 
things that the symbolic order prescribes based on the unconscious drive for the 
“unobtainable object of desire”), together create “the condition of possibility for 
enculturation” (see Haley 2014: 202–203, italics in original). 
 
7 Interpellation: Illusions without Owners 
Thus, in Žižek’s approach, ideology is “the exact opposite of internalization of 
external contingency: it resides in externalization of the result of an inner necessity” 
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(1994: 4). While the above insights about desire of the Other may, at first sight, be 
difficult to apply in the context of ancient history (as noted above in consideration of 
the mental realm of the historical subject), I will return to them at the end of this 
article in the context of the spread of the cult of Tyche. 
In the meantime, the process of the externalization of ideology, described by Žižek, 
offers some intriguing insights. This process begins with interpellation, which, 
according to its originator, Althusser, creates the subject of ideology. In his 
descriptions of it, Althusser describes it as a discourse, noting how “it can be 
imagined along the lines of the most commonplace everyday police (or other) hailing: 
‘Hey, you there!’” (1971: 162–163, italics in original) But in addition to this abstract 
process, Althusser also stresses the materialist aspect of what he calls the “subtle 
everyday domination” of ideologies (133). As he states, the concept of the material 
existence of an ideology and its practices needs to take account of “different 
modalities,” which, although all rooted in “physical matter,” are part of a larger nexus 
of apparatus, action, and practices. For the complicit subject, as Althusser puts it, “the 
ideas of his belief are material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted into 
material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the 
material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of the subject” (158–159). 
 But while ritual can be understood to reinforce an ideology in a subject, that 
still leaves open the question of what the subject is expressing in the first place when 
taking part in a ritual. Indeed, as Žižek (and others, for example, see Dolar 1993) have 
observed, this analysis leaves unanswered the problem of the origin of the ideology. It 
does not explain how the hailing process actually works, since individuals must have 
some sense of identity as subjects before they can recognize themselves as objects of 
interpellation. Žižek offers this approach: for him, the emphasis lies instead on 
precisely the experience of this process as a “senseless, traumatic injunction” that is 
necessarily incomplete; this, he goes on, “far from hindering the full submission of 
the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of it” (Žižek 1989: 43). 
This failed interpellation means that ideological identification also fails; that it is 
always “an identification with its fingers crossed” (1996: 166). The only way to 
reconcile this failure of interpellation is for the individual to take on this symbolic 
mandate. Žižek emphasizes both the curious “enjoyment” or jouissance that the 
subject can achieve by submitting to the imaginary identification, and, simultaneously, 
the sense of unbearable anxiety that the gap between the imaginary and symbolic 
identification creates (1989: 111). As we have seen above, it is this experience of “the 
kernel of my Self as something which preexists the process of interpellation” (1996: 
166) that also results from, as well as maintains and indeed comprises, desire for 
desire of the Other.17 
 I would like to suggest that this description includes a number of factors that 
are, at least, provocative as we attempt to gain a better understanding of the nature 
and functioning of low-intensity ancient Greek ritual activities and associated beliefs. 
To begin with, the process of interpellation — or rather the metaphor that it provides 
— gives some insight into the possible process of the transmission of beliefs and, 
more importantly, its implications.18 More concretely, the role of the material, as 
envisaged by this process, can be aligned with the role of ritual in ancient Greek 
religion — and not just religious rituals per se, but the web of embodied activities and 
                                                
17 But see Žižek’s acknowledgment of Pfaller’s approach, that this apparent “failure of interpellation” in fact 
demonstrates the success of ideological interpellation (Žižek’s 2000a: 134 n48, drawing on Pfaller 1998: 240–241). 
18 I hope it is unnecessary to observe that I am referring to the metaphor provided by Althusser, rather than 
arguing for a literal process of “hailing.” 
Please cite the published article (contact me and I’ll send it): 
esther.eidinow@bristol.ac.uk 
 
social institutions that supported them. For the ancient Greeks, as for Althusser’s 
modern subjects, the social and corporeal institutionalization of rituals embedded 
ideologies in the practices, desires and thoughts of everyday life. In addition, they 
were inextricably linked, according to this argument, with the constitution of subjects, 
and the associated idea that submitting to this symbolic order could prompt a sense of 
anxiety, a constant desire for desire of the Other, fits well with an ancient religious 
culture in which such anxiety seems to have been common. We can trace it, for 
example, in the uncertainty frequently expressed in a range of evidence as to which of 
the many gods or heroes a person should pray. That this aspect may have been a 
source of anxiety is suggested not only by, for example, the explicit questions on this 
topic posed to oracles by individuals facing a range of problems (see Eidinow 2013: 
136–141), but also by the sheer range not only of everyday ritual activities, but also of 
more specific initiations and personalized ritual services, intended not only to create 
new relationships, but also to maintain existing ones, with the gods. 
 These aspects concern the ways in which an individual may interact directly 
with the wider religious culture in order to engage meaningfully with low-intensity 
rituals and associated beliefs. But this article is also concerned with exploring the 
nature and operations of such widespread belief in the context of ancient Greek ritual 
activity and associated beliefs. In that context, the idea of an individual’s distance 
from their ideology is intriguing. It raises the possibility of viewing “belief” as 
functioning not only subjectively but also, as it has been termed, objectively. By this I 
mean that it suggests that, as Robert Pfaller has argued, an individual can be 
committed to beliefs not as if they were her own illusion or even “other people’s” 
illusion but as if they were “illusions without owners” (2003). To illustrate what this 
means for the argument of this article, we can turn to an example that is used by Žižek 
across a number of his publications: the story of the Emperor’s New Clothes. 
 
8 The Subject Supposed to Believe: Emperors and Subjects 
This well-known tale illustrates a number of aspects of ways that the symbolic order 
of an ideology exerts its power. The story is familiar: a common reading focuses on 
the role of the little boy who sees through the emperor’s claims, seeing it as a 
symbolic (and actual) undressing of power. However, if instead of focusing on the 
perspicacious little boy, we ask why did no one else raise the same questions, then it 
becomes illustrative of another facet of ideology, which I want to explore here, 
namely, the “subject supposed to believe” (cf. Bjerre and Laustsen 2010: 47–48). 
 In Žižek’s formulation, the subject supposed to believe is “a constitutive 
feature of the symbolic order” (Žižek 2006: 29);19 that is, it is a crucial element of the 
cultural structures within which we live, one that enables us to take as having a real 
material existence phenomena that actually exist only in thought or imagination. He 
gives as an example the ways in which we might treat a king as having powers 
inherent in his position rather than his person (2006: 35), or how, nowadays, in 
commercial transactions, we treat as magical those object  that in fact play an 
instrumental role within a symbolic system of exchange (94–95). Importantly, this is 
not a discussion of a “reified form of direct human belief” — far from it, there is no 
immediate self-present living subjectivity to whom the belief can be attributed. Rather, 
these beliefs are displaced onto the “big Other” — that is, the symbolic order within 
                                                
19 It appears to emerge from his dissatisfaction with “the subject supposed to know” of 
Lacanian psychoanalytical theory, which the patient transfers onto the analyst so that “he 
embodies the absolute certainty (which Lacan compares with the certainty of Descartes’ 
cogito ergo sum) of the patient’s unconscious desire” (Žižek 2006: 28). 
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which we all live — and it is this attribution, this dispossession that is original and 
constitutive. Thus, no proofs are needed to support belief, only the assertion of belief 
within the symbolic order, a role that de Certeau has depicted, relationally, as 
comprising an endless network of sureties always sought “further on” (1985a: 200; 
italics in original). 
 Turning to ancient Greek (religious) culture, it can be argued that the 
etiological narratives of ancient rituals would have provided an endless set of 
mythological “sureties” for their audiences, by demonstrating that someone, 
somewhere once performed the particular ritual for a specific reason. But we can also 
see a ritual itself as providing such a surety; by its very form — its apparently 
continuous transmission, its constant practice — it can be described as embodying 
“the subject supposed to believe.” This underlying understanding may have informed 
many cults, but perhaps especially the spread of the cult of Tyche, for which, 
incidentally, there is no etiological narrative of which we are aware. However, we can 
highlight other aspects that indicate the presence of a “network of sureties” in this 
case. These occur not in traces of stories told, but in the circulation of material 
evidence: for example, the image of the Tyche of Antioch became the model for the 
Tyche of other cities, reproduced throughout the Mediterranean (Stansbury-
O’Donnell 1994); in turn, as Yost (2008) has argued, Tyche’s mural crown offered a 
recognizable visual detail to inhabitants of Syria, who adopted her cult. This 
replication of particular imagery suggests an awareness of the attachment to Tyche of 
others — and/or her attachment to them; it reifies the presence of the subject 
supposed to believe. 
 
9 Interactivity and Interpassivity: Objective Belief 
Introduction of the material evidence of cult raises another aspect of the relevance of 
the idea of an individual’s distance from their ideology, and the way that we can 
observe Greek religion functioning objectively. This introduces the concepts of 
interactivity and interpassivity. The usual meaning of interactivity is to indicate a 
dialogic relationship, but Žižek draws our attention to a different meaning, one in 
which we find an object acting for us, that is, “I achieve my goal by way of 
interposing between me and the object on which I work another natural object” (2006: 
25).20 In the realm of ancient Greek religion, this brings to mind certain magical 
activities such as inscribed “prayers for justice” (see Versnel 2010), in which a person 
would scratch their prayer on, for example, a lead tablet, and thus dedicate their 
enemy to a divinity. In this, the ritual meant that the god was expected to “take on” 
this hostile activity on behalf of the writer, and, in turn, it can also be argued that the 
inscribed tablet itself “took on” the action of the writer. 
 While this is one perspective on such a process, in which the protagonist is 
“active” through these other interceding objects, another perspective views the 
protagonist as being passive through the object. Returning to the example of the 
prayer for justice, above, this would mean that we view the text not only as 
interactively taking on the action of the writer, but also as carrying out the writer’s 
emotional work. As Robert Pfaller has put it in his explanation of the process, “The 
interpassive person delegates her pleasure/consumption [or belief] to a medium by 
ritually causing this medium to perform a figurative representation of consumption” 
(2003). The emotions are extrajected as appropriate responses, and in this way, an 
                                                
20 And it need not be an object: the same process also can take place in interpersonal relations, 
such that instead of directly attacking my enemy, I start a fight between him and 
someone else — and watch the two of them attacking each other. 
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individual’s “most intimate feelings can be radically externalized” and projected into 
the symbolic realm. The symbolic efficiency of this activity is exactly the same as if 
the individual had done the action themselves, but in this process the object “feels” it 
for them: this is interpassivity, in which another (living or inanimate) object deprives 
me of my own passivity. 
 The object enjoys or consumes or believes for me: all these activities seem to 
be included in this idea; indeed, interpassivity has been described as the delegation of 
the “labour of emotional life.”21 As Pfaller (2014a: 15–16) notes, Žižek draws for this 
idea on observations of Jacques Lacan, who explained the role of the Greek chorus in 
the economy of enjoyment: 
When you go to the theatre in the evening, you are preoccupied by the 
affairs of the day, by the pen that you lost, by the check that you will have 
to sign the next day. You shouldn’t give yourselves too much credit. Your 
emotions are taken charge of by the healthy order displayed on the stage. 
The Chorus takes care of them. The emotional commentary is done for 
you…. Therefore, you don’t have to worry; even if you don’t feel anything, 
the Chorus will feel in your stead. 
Lacan 1992: 252 
Lacan is describing a displacement of subjectivity in which the chorus takes the role 
of feeling the audience’s emotions. As Lacan puts it, we are there “in the form of a 
material to be made use of; on the other hand, that material is also completely 
indifferent” (Lacan 1992: 247). 
 We can conceive of ritual activities as functioning in a similar way. Žižek 
offers a first example, albeit non-Greek (1989: 34): in the case of a Tibetan prayer 
wheel, paper is attached to the wheel, it is turned by wind or water, or mechanically, 
and the ritual object prays for me, taking on the activity that an individual would 
otherwise perform. To rid us of the idea that this is something purely pre-modern, 
Žižek also provides the example of canned laughter on TV programs, in which the 
soundtrack is active for me (1989: 35). But while we may recognize this as a 
diachronological phenomenon, if we remain with the pre-modern and turn to ancient 
Greek ritual activity, we can perhaps see that votive offerings can be argued to be 
playing a similar role to either the prayer wheel or, indeed, the canned laughter. A 
votive offering, through its ongoing presence, continues to attest to the relationship of 
charis that is sought between dedicator and god even after the individual who 
dedicated it has left the sanctuary. The inscription may, as scholars have argued (e.g., 
Day 2010), preserve the prayer pronounced when the votive was offered — especially 
if, as some have argued, it would have been read aloud by other sanctuary visitors — 
and thus it continues to obtain “a permanent effectiveness.” Finally, there was also the 
opportunity with some of these offerings to “recharge” them (as van Straten has 
described [1981: 74]) by inserting a burning lamp or making a small offering, perhaps 
a couple of coins. 
 The affective agency of the individual in these contexts is remarkably, even 
deliberately, limited by the form and structure of both the object and the ritual activity 
in which it features. To make this observation, I am admittedly drawing on the ways 
in which this concept has been used to critique digital media, but the observation 
seems still to be valid. It has been noted that while digital media are often praised as 
                                                
21 Sekimoto and Yajima discuss how “the notion of interpassivity illuminates the ‘outsourcing’ 
of emotional engagement and affective labor that otherwise requires a considerable 
amount of energy and attention in one’s everyday life” (2017: 29–30); they go on to discuss 
“affective labor.” 
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offering ways in which new forms of agency may emerge (digital citizenship, etc.), in 
fact they are “necessarily pre-inscribed with systemic qualities,” a situation that 
“automatically circumscribes and undermines the extent to which they can be 
substantively reappropriated for authentically transformative purposes” (Payne 2014: 
33, citing Taylor 2009: 102). As Pfaller notes, this delegation of feeling means that 
we need not feel so strongly — and this may have a pleasure of its own: “Can an 
absence of pleasure sometimes be identical with the pleasure of absence?” (2008: 13). 
 These observations can be illustrated by consideration of the spread of ancient 
Greek divine cults, including spread of the city cults of Tyche: like other divinities, 
her ongoing material presence in the city offered not only a network of sureties of 
others’ beliefs but also the reassurance of interpassivity — her presence in the city 
took care of that city’s future. As with other gods, the appeal of such a phenomenon 
would lie both in the delegation of feelings it offered and also in the notion that what 
it required of worshippers was circumscribed by the form associated with its function. 
Worshippers would, thus, displace their most intimate feelings and attitudes onto a 
symbolic structure; but this sense of distance did not necessarily negate the 
authenticity of the felt attachment. Indeed, such an experience may be in some ways 
coercive,22 creating the requirement to respond in line with the expectations of the 
form.23 Moreover, as Žižek puts it, although a passive feeling may have “started as a 
fake, we may end up ‘really feeling it’” (1999: 106). 
 These observations shift or nuance the meaning of the term “belief” as it is 
commonly used: instead of thinking of it as subjective, that is, as an “intimate,” purely 
mental state, Žižek positions it as “embodied, materialized in the effective functioning 
of the social field” (1989: 36), as “a-subjective” (1997: 107). As Pfaller has put it 
“belief can exist in the subjects’ actions, it need not necessarily reside in their 
consciousness” (2014b: 144). But, importantly, it does not deny a sense of attachment, 
returning us to a distinction raised earlier: that is, the idea of belief as faith, where by 
faith we mean “a binding engagement.” As Žižek observes, it is of course possible to 
believe in something without having faith in it (e.g., as he puts it, one can believe in 
ghosts but not feel bound to them by any pact or commitment), and (more to the point 
of the argument of this article) one can have faith in something without believing in it 
(2001: 109–110). As Žižek observes, the big Other or symbolic order is a shared 
fiction: nevertheless, even if we do not believe in it, or even really know it, it is still 
possible to feel a sense of shared commitment to it (cf. 2001: 199); in such a situation 
there is “always the need for the fiction of the ‘subject supposed to believe’” (109–
110). I want to suggest that this notion of the symbolic order, and especially the 
shared fiction that it entails, is an important factor in understanding the experience of 
our historical subjects in their engagement with low-intensity ritual activities and 
associated beliefs. And, returning to the question of the cult of Tyche, while we may 
not wish to understand the circulation of images of Tyche as indicating (a 
propositional) belief held by our historical subjects, nevertheless, in this context it 
may still be a significant indication that individuals felt a sense of “binding 
engagement” to this divine figure.24 
                                                
22 As others have pointed out with regard to digital media; see Sterne 2012. 
23 This is, as Žižek notes, what Freud called the “fetishist disavowal,” that is, that functioning 
of the symbolic order in which the social mask matters more than the direct reality of the 
individual who wears it (2006: 33). 
  
 
24 Indeed, in her analysis of the attitudes of the ancient Greeks to personifications as portrayed in poetry and 
literature, Barbara Borg has argued something similar: that it was not so important for the significance of these 
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10 Belief and … Relief? 
We return to where we started, the Theater of Dionysos in Athens in the last quarter 
of the fourth century. What did Menander’s audience think they were looking at as 
Tyche stood before them, laying out the plot of Aspis? Can we describe this character 
as the representation of a goddess, or simply a personification? 
Do we think the audience understood her to play the same role in their lives that she 
claims for herself in the prologue? What may we mean by saying that the audience 
“believed” in Tyche? On the one hand, in terms of the experience of our historical 
subjects, a range of different answers is possible, reflecting the range of individuals 
who would have been present in the theatre. On the other hand, in terms of what we 
may mean when we describe their approach, we can draw on the analysis above to 
argue for a commonly held “belief” in the figure of Tyche as a goddess. 
 This “belief” emerged for these individuals from their engagement in an 
ideology to whose symbolic mandate they had submitted. As I have argued above, 
this engagement would have turned on the network of sureties offered by other 
religious phenomena, both within the city and beyond (sanctuary, statues, votives, 
ritual activity, etc.), and it would have been reinforced by the commonly held 
experience of “the subject supposed to believe.” Indeed, the representation of Tyche 
on the stage was a reinforcement of this aspect of the symbolic order, but it also 
emphasizes the role of individuals (audience members or not) in promulgating and 
maintaining this wider ideology. Just as the emperor with no clothes depended on no 
one asking the same question as the little boy, so did the presence of the divine. 
Worshippers delegated their emotions to the figure of Tyche, and that displacement 
itself became original and constitutive, ensuring the continued significance of the god 
within their cultural structures.  
 In that context, and as a final observation, I want to draw attention to two 
ways that such an experience of externalization may have played a key role for our 
ancient subjects. First, it created a symbolic order, and daily lived experience, of 
which Tyche was an essential part. Second, it may have enabled individuals to cope 
with the anxiety created by their perception of, and concern about, divine involvement 
in their lives. As Žižek puts it:  
You find your belief too oppressing in its raw immediacy? Then kneel down, 
act as if you believed, and you will get rid of your belief — you will no longer 
have to believe yourself, your belief will already exist objectified in your act of 
praying. That is to say, what if one kneels down and prays not so much to regain 
one’s own belief but, on the opposite, to get rid of one’s belief, of its over-
proximity, to acquire a breathing space of a minimal distance towards it? To 
believe — to believe directly, without the externalising mediation of ritual — is 
a heavy, oppressive traumatic burden. (Žižek 2005: 237) 
 
If, indeed, ritual activities may be described as an expression of that externalization 
— and Žižek’s suggestion finds support from recent experimental work on the links 
between anxiety and ritualized behaviors (Lang et al. 2015) — it suggests a 
relationship between ritual and belief that is not often considered. It raises the 
possibility that ritual, rather than expressing the presence of the divine or 
communication with it, instead distanced the gods, and the anxiety that their presence 
                                                                                                                                      
works that the figures portrayed in them should be understood as actually existing, but rather that the 
characteristics and concepts that they embodied should seem both relevant and morally instructive (Borg 2002: 
232–233). 
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evoked. In turn, it also suggest that theories about the development of the 
personification of Tyche and the spread of her cult, as a symptom of a burgeoning 
sense of vulnerability to external sociopolitical forces (e.g., Pollitt 1986: esp. 2–3), 
can be extended to include the idea that the spread of her cult was also, in part, a 
response to the anxiety that her own presence generated. With this insight, we return, 
as promised, to Žižek’s description of the desire of the Other, and the way in which 
the anxiety created by the opacity of the Other’s desire maintains the desire of the 
Other. Mapped on to ancient Greek ritual activity, it suggests that the presence of the 
divine created among its subjects an anxiety to please; this was ameliorated, at least in 
part, by the rituals they enacted; but it was also exacerbated, because these rituals 
actually helped to maintain the sense of the presence of the divine. 
 
11 Conclusion 
As others have observed, in the field of ancient Greek religion, there has been a 
period of scholarship in which the possibility of attributing belief to historical subjects 
has, at least, been seen to be highly problematic, and even, at its most extreme, denied. 
Investigations of the nature of ancient “belief” have been hampered not only by 
assumptions about the composition, meaning, and expression of “belief” but also, I 
have argued here, by implicit concern about the appropriate nature or not of its objects. 
While recent interest in individual religious activities has grown (partly as a reaction 
to “polis religion,” but also stimulated by investigations of the role of ritual, the body, 
and the mind), questions about the nature and transmission of low-intensity ritual 
activities and associated beliefs remain. 
 In this context, I have suggested that we might draw on Žižek’s notion of 
“ideology” in order to broaden the scope of discussions of ancient Grrek religious 
“belief,” and in particular to allow a fuller exploration of widespread, “low-intensity” 
ritual activities and associated beliefs in ancient Greek culture. By discussing Greek 
religion in terms of a symbolic order, by introducing these ideas of the big Other and 
the range of ways in which “belief” may be generated and maintained, this approach 
is intended to encourage a focus on the evidence for interactions with the divine and 
their implications, rather than (implicit) judgments about either the status of a divinity 
or the mindset of her worshipper. With reference to Tyche specifically, as I hope I 
have shown, it suggests that, in the sense that she occupied a key role in the shared 
symbolic order, this goddess was as much a recipient of low-intensity ritual activities 
and beliefs as any other in the pantheon. 
 In making this argument, this article has not aimed to deny the importance of 
examining the experience of the individual. Rather it aims to prompt discussion of 
how individual and wider culture were related. Indeed, it has tried to show how, by 
implicating individuals in their (historical) social and cultural context, we may begin 
to see how maps of meaning could be shared, developed, and inculcated, not only at 
the level of abstracted symbolic meaning, but expressed in and by external material 
things, including bodily experiences, activities, and practices. Such an approach may 
help us to understand different ways of nuancing the meaning of the term “belief” by 
(at least) considering the range of ways in which a set of ideas may be transmitted, 
received, and internalized, and exploring the relationship between an individual or 
group and the wider culture they shape and that shapes them. 
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